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Industry and government tried to use information technologies to 
respond to the COVID-19 pandemic, but using the internet as a tool for 
disease surveillance, public health messaging, and testing logistics turned 
out to be a disappointment.  Why weren’t these efforts more effective?  This 
Essay argues that industry and government efforts to leverage technology 
were doomed to fail because tech platforms have failed over the past few 
decades to make their tools trustworthy, and lawmakers have done little 
to hold these companies accountable.  People cannot trust the interfaces 
they interact with, the devices they use, and the systems that power tech 
companies’ services.   
This Essay explores these pre-existing privacy ills that contributed to 
these problems, including manipulative user interfaces, consent regimes 
that burden people with all the risks of using technology, and devices that 
collect far more data than they should.  A pandemic response is only as 
good as its adoption, but pre-existing privacy and technology concerns 
make it difficult for people seeking lifelines to have confidence in the 
technologies designed to protect them.  We argue that a good way to help 
close the technology trust gap is through relational duties of loyalty and 
care, better frameworks regulating the design of information 
technologies, and substantive rules limiting data collection and use 
instead of procedural “consent and control” rules.  We conclude that the 
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pandemic could prove to be an opportunity to leverage motivated 
lawmakers to improve our privacy frameworks and make information 
technologies worthy of our trust. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION  
One of the factors that has made responding to the COVID-19 
pandemic so difficult and frustrating is that industry’s current strategy 
of building an app for every problem was ineffective.  Silicon Valley 
created the world’s most powerful surveillance network and tools to 
influence populations.  But few people wanted to use proximity 
notification apps, and social media was a swamp of disinformation 
about the virus, treatments, and public health advice.  Modern 
technology allows us to monitor the coronavirus’s spread in detail and 
facilitate public health interventions—but only if people trust the tools 
they are being asked to use and the companies and governments they 
are dealing with.  There is plenty to critique about the entire 
institutional and individual response to the pandemic, but the seeds of 
our collective inability to effectively utilize information technologies as 
part of our pandemic response were sown long ago.  They just bloomed 
during the pandemic.  
The rapid and sometimes heavy-handed implementation of 
pandemic-response technologies is emblematic of the complicated 
relationship between individuals and organizations who handle this 
data.  We argue that industry and government efforts to leverage 
technology were doomed to fail because tech companies have failed 
over the past twenty years to make their tools trustworthy and 
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lawmakers have done little to hold these companies accountable.  
People cannot trust the interfaces they interact with, the devices they 
use, and the systems that power tech companies’ services.  Given this 
historical context, why would people trust their technology to aid them 
during a life-and-death public health crisis?   
In this Essay, we explore the pre-existing ills that contributed to 
these problems, including manipulative user interfaces, consent 
regimes that burden people with all the risks of using technology, and 
devices that collect far more data than they should.  A pandemic 
response is only as good as its adoption, but pre-existing privacy and 
technology concerns make it difficult for people seeking lifelines to have 
confidence in the technologies designed to protect them.  
Our argument proceeds in three parts.  First, in Part II, we outline 
efforts to use technology to respond to the pandemic and why they were 
fraught.  As an example, we detail Google’s Project Baseline, which 
aimed to help people identify COVID testing centers.  We show how 
questionable requests and broken promises undermined the 
trustworthiness of the effort.  We also describe concerns with other 
technological interventions, such as proximity notification apps and 
surveillance technologies.  Next, in Part III, we explore one phenomenon 
that hobbled our technological response to COVID—technology’s trust 
gap.  Simply put, when people cannot trust the layout of the screens they 
interact with, the design of the devices they use, and the background 
decision-making of the systems they expose themselves to, people are 
not in a position to use these technologies in a public health crisis.  We 
explore concepts such as dark patterns, insecure Internet of Things 
(IoT) devices, and algorithms that target the vulnerable and spread 
public health misinformation.  Collectively, these problems give people 
little reason to feel safe using any digital technology, even if doing so 
would improve their health prospects. 
 In Part IV, we propose a way for lawmakers and industry to earn 
and ensure peoples’ trust.  We argue that a good way to help close the 
technology trust gap is through relational duties of loyalty and care, 
better frameworks regulating the design of information technologies, 
and substantive rules limiting data collection and use instead of 
procedural “consent and control” regimes.  We conclude that the 
pandemic could provide an opportunity for motivated lawmakers to 
improve our privacy frameworks and make information technologies 
worthy of our trust. 
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II.  DISAPPOINTING TECHNOLOGICAL INTERVENTIONS IN THE PANDEMIC 
COVID required government and industry to act with 
unprecedented speed and scale.  Thankfully, our existing technological 
infrastructure allows companies to implement solutions swiftly and 
broadly.  Unfortunately, companies could not break bad habits 
developed from decades of information gluttony.1  Technology 
presented users with questionable requests for additional information 
and broken data security promises before the pandemic.  When people 
are desperate for a lifeline, they become ripe for exploitation when 
governments and corporations make questionable requests for data or 
misuse information they have collected.  Even when companies set out 
to create a privacy-friendly intervention, such as Apple and Google’s 
respective efforts to leverage their phones for proximity notification 
apps,2 they are continuing to draw water from a well that Silicon Valley 
poisoned years ago.  There are complex reasons why institutions had 
trouble leveraging technologies to respond to the pandemic.  Much of 
this failure is intertwined with governmental shortcomings.  But tech 
companies’ questionable requests, broken promises, and techno-
solutionism are a significant part of this story.  
A.  Questionable Requests  
Data is an asset, and these days, an incredibly valuable one.3  It 
powers the data economy,4 which extracts user data and turns it into 
insights that can help peddle advertisements and personalization 
features in the world of digital commerce.  To learn more about users, 
tech companies at all levels of the online experience amass billions of 
 
 1 For a more detailed look at the pathologies of information capitalism, see 
generally JULIE COHEN, BETWEEN TRUTH AND POWER (2020).  
 2 Privacy-Preserving Contact Tracing, APPLE, https://covid19.apple.com/contact
tracing (last visited Apr. 04, 2021); Exposure Notifications: Using Technology to Help 
Public Health Authorities Fight COVID-19, GOOGLE, https://www.google.com/covid19/
exposurenotifications/ (last visited Apr. 04, 2021). 
 3 ALBERT OPHER ET AL., THE RISE OF THE DATA ECONOMY: DRIVING VALUE THROUGH INTERNET 
OF THINGS DATA MONETIZATION 16 (2016), https://www.ibm.com/downloads/cas/4JRO
LDQ7. 
 4 Ludwig Siegele, A Deluge of Data Is Giving Rise to a New Economy, ECONOMIST, (Feb. 
20, 2020),  https://www.economist.com/special-report/2020/02/20/a-deluge-of-
data-is-giving-rise-to-a-new-economy; Knowledge@Wharton, Data as Currency: What 
Value Are You Getting for It?, WHARTON SCH. BUS. (Aug. 27, 2019),  https://knowledge.
wharton.upenn.edu/article/barrett-data-as-currency. 
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data points from which to mine these insights, but a question remains: 
is all of that data absolutely necessary to collect?5   
In the early days of the pandemic in the United States, Alphabet’s 
life sciences arm, Verily, began a program called Project Baseline to help 
people find COVID-19 testing centers and get screened before receiving 
a test.6  The service was initially available in California but has since 
expanded to include several states across the U.S.7  By October, however, 
some California cities shuttered their partnerships with Project 
Baseline, particularly due to the requirement that people seeking 
COVID-19 screenings must prove their identity through a Google 
Account or otherwise register for one—as well as account 
authentication hurdles for vulnerable populations like the homeless.8  
Project Baseline’s COVID-19 program eligibility requirements cite 
that an individual must be eighteen years of age or older, able to get to 
a test site, and willing to sign an authorization and consent form—but 
do not mention the mandatory Google Account as part of the eligibility 
criteria.9  While Project Baseline assures that data used by the COVID-
19 program is stored separately and not directly linked to an 
individual’s Google Account,10 the fact remains that individuals must 
accept the risk of surveillance or take on the burden of deleting the 
Google Account after receiving a screening. 
While Verily’s promises of data separation and limited use may be 
well and good, it is concerning that people seeking tests in a matter of 
life and death were required to consent to Google’s entire data 
ecosystem to participate in public health safety guidelines.  The 
homepage for the COVID-19 program describes it as “an effort to expand 
access to COVID-19 screening and testing,” which few would argue 
against.  Beyond this, Verily announced a partnership with Janssen 
 
 5 Walter Frick, Do Tech Companies Really Need All That User Data?, HARV. BUS. REV. 
(Sept. 21, 2017), https://hbr.org/2017/09/do-tech-companies-really-need-all-that-
user-data. 
 6 Verily, In Collaboration With The California Governor’s Office, Federal, State, And 
Local Public Health Authorities, Will Launch Pilot Intended To Expand Access To COVID-
19 Risk Screening And Testing For High Risk Individuals At Bay Area Locations, PROJECT 
BASELINE (Mar. 15, 2020), https://blog.projectbaseline.com/2020/03/verily-in-
collaboration-with-california.html. 
 7 COVID-19 Testing Program, PROJECT BASELINE, https://www.projectbaseline.com/
covid-19 (last visited Apr. 04, 2021). 
 8 Jenny Gold & Pradhan Rachana, Verily’s COVID Testing Program Halted in San 
Francisco and Oakland, KAISER HEALTH NEWS (Oct. 26, 2020), https://khn.org/news/
verilys-covid-testing-program-halted-in-san-francisco-and-oakland; COVID-19 FAQ, 
PROJECT BASELINE, https://www.projectbaseline.com/covid-support. 
 9 COVID-19 Testing Program, supra note 7. 
 10 COVID-19 FAQ, supra note 8. 
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Research & Development to launch a new COVID-19-related study as 
part of Project Baseline, using data from screening users to determine 
eligible participants.11  This follows a previous study launched by Verily, 
which began in May of 2020, to study immune responses to the virus.12  
Verily stated that study participants needed to have previous COVID-19 
test results, but that these tests did not have to be conducted by Verily.13  
Considering that the original purpose of Project Baseline was to “make 
it easier for people to participate in clinical research,”14 it is still unclear 
why Google Accounts are the only acceptable form of authentication for 
COVID-19 screening, when prerequisites to join the Verily studies do not 
require Verily tests. 
A Google account-or-nothing consent regime in such distressing 
times is worrisome, even if COVID-19 data is kept separate from the 
greater Google ecosystem.  Promises that data will remain siloed are 
hard to trust.  In the early days of the pandemic, few other options for 
getting tests existed, and individuals should not have had to consent to 
tertiary services in their efforts to protect their health.  
As many have pointed out, industry’s values do not always align 
with the public interest, and this can create issues when trying to 
fashion technology-driven solutions to public problems.15  It can be 
difficult to disentangle tech companies’ benevolence in a pandemic with 
their profit-driven goals.  
B.  Broken Promises 
When technology changes faster than individuals can understand 
and respond, people are put at a steep disadvantage when it comes to 
protecting their privacy.  System designs that do not seriously protect 
privacy are vulnerable to mission creep and exploitation over time, 
 
 11 Frank Vinluan, Verily Joins with Janssen, Adding Covid-19 to Project Baseline Study, 
MEDCITY NEWS (Feb. 9, 2021, 12:00 PM), https://medcitynews.com/2021/02/verily-
joins-with-janssen-adding-covid-19-to-project-baseline-study; Verily Partners with 
Janssen to Launch COVID-19 Immune Response Study, VERILY LIFE SCI. (Feb. 8, 2021), 
https://verily.com/stories/verily-partners-with-janssen-to-launch-covid-19-immune-
response-study. 
 12 Elise Reuter, Alphabet’s Verily launches Covid-19 antibody study, MEDCITY NEWS, 
(May 18, 2020), https://medcitynews.com/2020/05/alphabets-verily-launches-covid-
19-antibody-study. 
 13 Id. 
 14 New Baseline COVID-19 Research Project launches, VERILY LIFE SCIS. (May 18, 2020), 
https://verily.com/stories/new-baseline-covid-19-research-project-launches. 
 15 See, e.g., Julie Cohen, Woodrow Hartzog, and Laura Moy, The Dangers of Tech-
Driven Solutions to COVID-19, BROOKINGS INST. (June 17, 2020), https://www.brookings.
edu/techstream/the-dangers-of-tech-driven-solutions-to-covid-19.  See generally 
COHEN, supra note 1; FRANK PASQUALE, THE NEW LAWS OF ROBOTICS (2020).  
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whether through unprecedented data collection under promises of 
“temporary” pandemic purposes or through data being repurposed 
beyond its original goal.  The whiplash of failed privacy promises leads 
to greater doubt and distrust in technologies intended to protect public 
health. 
Singapore, one of the first countries to deploy contact tracing apps 
to track the spread of COVID-19 among its population, is a good example 
of how mission creep leads to broken promises and the erosion of trust.  
The country initially struggled with the adoption of their voluntary 
TraceTogether smartphone app.16  First released in March 2020, the app 
was reportedly adopted by a mere 20% of the population by May,17 
when the app became mandatory for migrant workers.18  To address the 
needs of citizens who do not use or prefer not to use a mobile phone, the 
Singaporean government provided physical proximity devices (called 
the TraceTogether Token) and made these available to Singaporeans in 
June.19  
Both the app and the token use a custom protocol, BlueTrace, that 
collects information from either a smartphone or the token whenever 
devices with TraceTogether installed detect each other.  This protocol 
facilitates proximity tracing by keeping records of who has come into 
proximate contact with one another.  By November, nearly half of the 
country’s residents had adopted the application20 and a digital check-in 
system, SafeEntry,21 but by then it seemed that the government would 
make the app or token mandatory for people visiting public facilities by 
 
 16 TRACETOGETHER, GOV’T OF SINGAPORE, https://www.tracetogether.gov.sg (last visited 
Apr. 04, 2021); Sarah Kreps et al., Contact-tracing apps face serious adoption obstacles, 
BROOKINGS INST. (May 20, 2020), https://www.brookings.edu/techstream/contact-
tracing-apps-face-serious-adoption-obstacles. 
 17 Sarah Kreps et al., supra note 16. 
 18 Press Release, Singapore Ministry of Manpower, New Resources to Provide Better 
Care for Migrant Workers (May 27, 2020), https://www.mom.gov.sg/newsroom/press-
releases/2020/0527-new-resources-to-provide-better-care-for-migrant-workers. 
 19 Press Release, Seniors to Receive First Batch of TraceTogether Tokens, Smart 




 20 Bobbie Johnson, Some Prominent Exposure Apps are Slowly Rolling Back Freedoms, 
MIT TECH. REV. (Nov. 23, 2020), https://www.technologyreview.com/2020/11/23/
1012491/contact-tracing-mandatory-singapore-covid-pandemic. 
 21 SAFEENTRY, https://safeentry.gov.sg (last visited Feb. 23, 2021). 
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December 2020.22  In mid-December, the target date for mandatory 
TraceTogether check-in was pushed back to early 2021.23 
Then, in early January 2021, the Singaporean government 
announced that the police would be able to access data collected by the 
TraceTogether/SafeEntry system for use in seven categories of criminal 
offenses—contradicting claims the government made at launch that the 
technologies would be used solely for contact tracing, right as nearly 
80% of the country’s population had adopted the software.24  A minister 
who previously touted the TraceTogether software as “purely for 
contract tracing” revealed that contract tracing data had already been 
used by the Singaporean police in a murder investigation.25  
TraceTogether’s privacy policy was updated to reflect this revelation 
after the minister’s announcement on January 4, 2021—almost a year 
after the app’s initial release without this disclosure.26 
Governments naturally want to commandeer powerful tools for 
their own purposes.  Google and Apple are creating a playbook for 
governments on how our phones can be repurposed for all kinds of 
surveillance.  Even large and powerful companies are subject to political 
pressure.  Will tech companies that develop COVID information 
technologies be able to resist indefinitely governments’ attempts to 
change the design of these tools?  The U.S. government vacated its order 
to compel Apple into building a modified iOS that would allow them to 
bypass encryption protections, but can we always count on this 
backtracking?27  Apple reportedly dropped its plan to allow users to 
 
 22 Lester Wong, Use of TraceTogether App or Token Mandatory By End Dec., STRAITS 
TIMES (Oct. 21, 2020), https://www.straitstimes.com/singapore/use-of-tracetogether-
app-or-token-mandatory-by-end-dec; Lester Wong, Singapore Cinemas to Begin Rolling 
Out Compulsory TraceTogether-Only Entry From Oct. 26, STRAITS TIMES (Oct. 19, 2020), 
https://www.straitstimes.com/tech/singapore-cinemas-to-begin-rolling-out-
compulsory-tracetogether-only-entry-from-oct-26. 
 23 Press Release, Moving Into Phase Three of Re-Opening, Ministry of Health of 
Singapore (Dec. 14, 2020), https://www.moh.gov.sg/news-highlights/details/moving-
into-phase-three-of-re-opening. 
 24 Mia Sato, Singapore’s police now have access to contact tracing data, MIT TECH. REV. 
(Jan. 5, 2021), https://www.technologyreview.com/2021/01/05/1015734/singapore-
contact-tracing-police-data-covid. 
 25 Amir Hussain, TraceTogether Data Used by Police in One Murder Case: Vivian 
Balakrishnan, YAHOO NEWS (Jan. 5, 2021), https://uk.news.yahoo.com/trace-together-
data-used-by-police-in-one-murder-case-vivian-084954246.html. 
 26 TRACETOGETHER, supra note 16.  
 27 Romain Dillet, Justice Department Drops Lawsuit Against Apple as FBI has now 
Unlocked Farook’s iPhone, TECHCRUNCH (Mar. 28, 2016), https://techcrunch.com/2016/
03/28/justice-department-drops-lawsuit-against-apple-over-iphone-unlocking-case. 
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encrypt their backups in the cloud after the FBI complained.28  This dam 
will not hold indefinitely.  
A pandemic response clearly must escalate in proportion to the 
intensity of a global health crisis.  Governments and private 
organizations can and should do what is necessary to stop the spread 
and protect human lives—but they should not overstep boundaries 
under a blanket excuse of public health.  Mission creep violates our 
expectations of safety and privacy and makes us skeptical of 
government actions that may be repurposed post-pandemic.   
C.  Techno-Solutionism 
One of the most predictable and often misguided trends of the 
smartphone era is tech companies and governments trying to solve 
complex social problems with apps.29  “There’s an app for that” is not 
just a marketing slogan30—it is an operating ethos for Silicon Valley.  But 
overreliance on apps and technical solutions is not just a question of 
efficacy.  It represents a massive opportunity cost, as it diverts valuable 
political capital and dominates public discourse when other more 
difficult, but more effective and sustainable, options are the wiser path. 
One of the most high-profile technological pandemic interventions 
was Google and Apple’s respective modifications of their phones’ 
operating systems to accommodate proximity notification apps.31  The 
project modified the iOS and Android operating systems to allow 
government health agencies to build apps that use a mobile phone’s 
Bluetooth communication capabilities.32  These apps would enable a 
person who tests positive for the coronavirus to send out an “exposure” 
notification to other app users’ phones to alert them that their phones 
had been in the vicinity of the infected person’s phone during a given 
period.  People getting this information could decide whether to self-
isolate or get tested.  
To protect privacy, the system only used Bluetooth, did not collect 
location data, hid a user’s identity, required permission to collect 
proximity data or upload data from the phones of people who test 
 
 28 Joseph Menn, Exclusive: Apple Dropped Plan for Encrypting Backups After FBI 
Complained––Sources, REUTERS (Jan. 21, 2020), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-
apple-fbi-icloud-exclusive/exclusive-apple-dropped-plan-for-encrypting-backups-
after-fbi-complained-sources-idUSKBN1ZK1CT. 
 29 See, e.g., EVGENY MOROZOV, TO SAVE EVERYTHING, CLICK HERE (2013).  
 30 Brian Chen, Apple Registers Trademark for ‘There’s an App for That’, WIRED (Sept. 
10, 2010), https://www.wired.com/2010/10/app-for-that.  
 31 Steph Hannon, Exposure Notifications: End of Year Update, GOOGLE (Dec. 11, 2020), 
https://blog.google/inside-google/covid-19/exposure-notifications-end-year-update. 
 32 See supra note 2. 
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positive for COVID-19, and stored all data locally on a user’s phone 
unless the user decided to notify others.33  Additionally, the companies 
required users to enter a unique code provided by health authorities to 
notify nearby users that they have been infected.34  
Adoption of this contact tracing technology, both by governments 
and citizens, varied widely.  In the United States, efforts to roll out apps 
with Exposure Notification features must be conducted at the state level, 
with the app approved only in nineteen U.S. states as of December 
2020.35  For some states, adoption levels among the population were 
lower than 10% even after months of the apps’ availability.36  In other 
regions, numbers are more promising37 but still fall short of ideal.   
The public has good reason to view COVID apps with a critical eye.  
First, tech platforms can only control so much.  For example, Google and 
Apple promised to serve as staunch gatekeepers of the system they 
created by only allowing government health authorities to use the 
Exposure Notification tracing capabilities.38  To protect civil liberties, 
the companies said they would not allow other government agencies to 
mandate use of the app (presumably by denying them system access).  
That does not prevent other parties like employers and schools, who are 
not bound by the platforms’ terms of use for app developers, from 
requiring app participation as a condition of employment or entrance.  
It is also unclear how well Apple and Google can police the app operators 
to ensure that the apps comply with the rules.  How can policymakers 
help guarantee system-wide fidelity when it is so easy for things to fall 
through the cracks? 
But perhaps the biggest reason people are rightfully distrustful of 
an app-based approach to complex social problems is the concept of 
path dependency—the idea that norms, history, and technical and 
organizational structure make diverting from a particular path difficult.  
Once deployed, information tools, systems, and practices are unlikely to 
be “rolled back.”  Governments and tech platforms repeatedly touted 
 
 33 APPLE, INC. AND GOOGLE, EXPOSURE NOTIFICATIONS FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS (2020), 
https://static.googleusercontent.com/media/www.google.com/en//covid19/exposur
enotifications/pdfs/Exposure-Notification-FAQ-v1.2.pdf.  
 34 WI Exposure Notification App Privacy Policy, WIS. DEP’T OF HEALTH SERVS.  (Dec. 23, 
2020), https://www.dhs.wisconsin.gov/covid-19/app-privacy.htm. 
 35 Asmae Fahmy, Google and Apple Join Forces to Bolster Contact Tracing, VERYWELL 
HEALTH (Dec. 21, 2020), https://www.verywellhealth.com/google-apple-exposure-
notification-covid-5092947; Alejandro De La Garza, People are Finally Downloading 
COVID-19 Exposure Notification Apps. Will They Make a Difference?, TIME (Dec. 14, 2020), 
https://time.com/5921518/covid-exposure-notification-apps. 
 36 De La Garza, supra note 35. 
 37 Hannon, supra note 31. 
 38 EXPOSURE NOTIFICATIONS FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS, supra note 33. 
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contact tracing apps and COVID-19-related surveillance as temporary 
measures for use only until the pandemic passes.  That is likely to be a 
fantasy. 
Surveillance inertia is remarkably difficult to resist.  Norms get set, 
and practices and tools become entrenched.  And who can say when this 
will wind down?  We are still dealing with the supposedly temporary 
surveillance authorized almost twenty years ago in the wake of 9/11.  
Rollbacks are rare and highly unlikely because the tools we build today 
create a path dependency that will shape our future data and 
surveillance practices. 
There are significant opportunity costs and switching costs for 
such heavy investments in these contact tracing apps.  This tech-first 
approach was less effective than governments hoped.  But industry and 
government do not often have the resolve and humility to double back 
and try a different approach.  Plus, the time lost to proximity 
notification, which governments could have used to coordinate better 
tools for public health messaging and a more effective and equitable 
public health rollout, is time we cannot get back.  
Silicon Valley tries to make all tasks easier.  Tech platforms see the 
costs associated with searching, sharing, and sorting as things to be 
eliminated.  But in the wake of countless privacy lapses on social 
platforms and an unending wave of data breaches, it is clear that making 
tasks easier, even important ones, can have the potential to cause great 
collateral harm.  The public is coming around to this.  Tech companies’ 
crisis of trust should come as no surprise to anyone.  
III.  A LACK OF TRUST IN TECHNOLOGIES 
It turns out that Silicon Valley’s approach of “moving fast and 
breaking things” does not inspire a lot of confidence.  In this Part we will 
explore how the concerns that plagued pandemic-response 
technologies were present well before the virus began to spread.  We 
consider three specific untrustworthy contexts: individuals cannot trust 
the content and interfaces before their eyes, they cannot trust the 
devices and software they use to keep their data safe, and they cannot 
trust that their data would not be abused or used against them.  
Privacy and trust are intuitively connected.  We disclose our secrets 
only to trusted individuals in real life if we can help it and try to reveal 
only public or benign information to new acquaintances.  In technology, 
information and computer security rely on myriad authentication 
methods to verify whether parties in communication with one another, 
be they computer or device or human, can be trusted to continue with 
data transfer.  In law, privacy takes many interpretations, but trust is 
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one option that defines privacy within relational contexts—especially 
for information relationships.39 
When people cannot trust the tools they use, they will withdraw or 
be hurt and misguided.  Technology’s trust gap existed before the 
pandemic and is likely to continue long after it.  Until lawmakers ensure 
that tech companies will respect peoples’ trust, the same problems will 
exist when lawmakers and industry try to leverage information 
technologies to respond to the next public health emergency.  In this 
Part, we expand upon the privacy problems we outlined in Part II.  We 
break our analysis down into three areas of user inter interaction: an 
interface and information level, a device and security level, and a 
systemic, organizational level.  
A.  Interfaces and Information 
The internet has a legitimacy problem, even during a pandemic.  As 
people are encouraged to stay at home and socially distance, the 
resultant uptick in internet use exacerbates existing problems with 
interface design elements in software and apps as well as the alarming 
rate of misinformation across social media.  
‘Dark patterns,’ which are software interfaces crafted to trick users 
into activities they did not otherwise intend to perform, plagued the 
screens of people looking to their tools for help during the pandemic.40  
Some dark patterns can lead to financial consequences, such as patterns 
employed to get users to purchase additional services in online 
 
 39 See generally DANIEL SOLOVE, THE DIGITAL PERSON 42–45 (2006); ARI EZRA WALDMAN, 
PRIVACY AS TRUST: INFORMATION PRIVACY FOR AN INFORMATION AGE 7 (2018); Jack M. Balkin, 
Information Fiduciaries and the First Amendment, 49 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1183, 1187 
(2016); Jack Balkin, The Fiduciary Model of Privacy, 134 HARV. L. REV. F. 11, 14 (2020); 
Kiel Brennan-Marquez, Fourth Amendment Fiduciaries, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 611, 612 
(2015); Lauren Scholz, Fiduciary Boilerplate, 46 J. CORP. L. 143 (2020); Ian Kerr, The Legal 
Relationship Between Online Service Providers and Users, 35 CAN. BUS. L.J. 419, 446 
(2001); Neil Richards & Woodrow Hartzog, Taking Trust Seriously in Privacy Law, 19 
STAN. TECH. L. REV. 431 (2016); Neil Richards & Woodrow Hartzog, Privacy’s Trust Gap: A 
Review, 126 YALE L.J. 1180, 1185 (2017); Neil Richards & Woodrow Hartzog, Trusting 
Big Data Research, 66 DEPAUL L. REV. 579 (2017); Neil Richards & Woodrow Hartzog, A 
Relational Turn for Data Protection?, 4 EUROPEAN DATA PROT. L. REV. 1, 3 (2020); Neil 
Richards & Woodrow Hartzog, A Duty of Loyalty for Privacy Law (forthcoming 2021); Ari 
Ezra Waldman, Privacy As Trust: Sharing Personal Information in A Networked World, 69 
U. MIAMI L. REV. 559, 560 (2015); Ari Ezra Waldman, Privacy, Sharing, and Trust: The 
Facebook Study, 67 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 193 (2016).  But see Lina M. Khan & David E. 
Pozen, A Skeptical View of Information Fiduciaries, 133 HARV. L. REV. 497, 498 (2019). 
 40 Harry Brignull, Dark Patterns: Deception vs. Honesty in UI Design, A LIST APART 
(Nov. 1, 2011), https://alistapart.com/article/dark-patterns-deception-vs-honesty-in-
ui-design; Colin M. Gray, et al., The Dark (Patterns) Side of UX Design, in PROCEEDINGS OF 
THE 2018 CHI CONFERENCE ON HUMAN FACTORS IN COMPUTING SYSTEMS, 1, 1–14 (2018), 
http://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?doid=3173574.3174108. 
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shopping contexts.41  Others may have privacy consequences, such as 
“Bad Defaults,”42 which are default settings that are set to the options 
that benefit user privacy least.  Dark patterns are the dark underbelly of 
persuasive technologies43 or nudges—designs that facilitate an 
individual’s decision-making toward a specific outcome.44  Both dark 
patterns, or “sludges,”45 and nudges exploit cognitive biases.46  The 
difference lies in who benefits from the outcomes of an individual’s 
nudged choices.  Research on dark patterns spans several disciplines, 
including behavioral economics, psychology, computer science, human-
computer interaction, and law.  
All interface designs influence people one way or another.  Choice 
architecture cannot be avoided or “wish[ed] [] away.”47  People are 
inundated with daily choices, and even more so when using digital 
technologies—the number of choices is overwhelming.48  Choices must 
be constrained within the services we use.49  When it comes to privacy, 
however, individuals’ autonomy and control over their data must be 
improved, rather than eroded, through the use of dark patterns.50 
 
 41 Arunesh Mathur, et al., Dark Patterns at Scale: Findings from a Crawl of 11K 
Shopping Websites, 3 PROC. ACM HUM-COMPUT. INTERACTIONS 1, 2 (2019) [hereinafter Dark 
Patterns at a Scale]; Arunesh Mathur, et al., What Makes a Dark Pattern. . . Dark? Design 
Attributes, Normative Considerations, and Measurement Methods, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 
2021 CHI CONFERENCE ON HUMAN FACTORS IN COMPUTING SYSTEMS 1, 13 (forthcoming 2021) 
[hereinafter What Makes a Dark Pattern. . .Dark?], http://arxiv.org/abs/2101.04843. 
 42 Christoph Bosch et al., Tales from the Dark Side: Privacy Dark Strategies and 
Privacy Dark Patterns, 2016(4) PROC. ON PRIV. ENHANCING TECHS. 237, 248 (2016); Ari Ezra 
Waldman, Cognitive Biases, Dark Patterns, and the “Privacy Paradox”, 31 CURRENT ISSUES 
IN PSYCH. 105, 105, 107–09 (2020). 
 43 B. J. FOGG, PERSUASIVE TECHNOLOGY: USING COMPUTERS TO CHANGE WHAT WE THINK AND 
DO 213 (1st ed. 2002). 
 44 RICHARD H. THALER & CASS SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT HEALTH, 
WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS (2009). 
 45 Richard H. Thaler, Nudge, Not Sludge, 361 SCI. MAG. 431 (Aug. 3, 2018), 
https://science.sciencemag.org/content/361/6401/431; Stuart Mills, Nudge/Sludge 
Symmetry: On the Relationship Between Nudge and Sludge and the Resulting Ontological, 
Normative and Transparency Implications, BEHAVIOURAL PUB. POL. 1, 12 (2020); Olivia 
Goldhill, Politicians Love Nudge Theory. But Beware its Doppelgänger “Sludge”, QUARTZ 
(July 31, 2019), https://qz.com/1679102/sludge-takes-nudge-theory-to-new-
manipulative-levels. 
 46 See generally Waldman, supra note 42, at 2; see also Dark Patterns at a Scale, supra 
note 41; What Makes a Dark Pattern…Dark?, supra note 41. 
 47 Cass R. Sunstein, The Ethics of Nudging, 32 YALE J. REGUL. 413, 449 (2015), 
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjreg/vol32/iss2/6. 
 48 Woodrow Hartzog, The Case Against Idealising Control, 4 EUROPEAN DATA PROT. L. 
REV. 423, 429 (2018). 
 49 Id. at 426. 
 50 See generally Bosch, et al., supra note 42. 
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In a pandemic, people flock not only to government-recommended 
applications or health-related applications like Project Baseline51 but 
also to social software and platforms.  Strict lockdown measures and 
severe adjustments to quotidian living led to sharp increases in the 
usership of several applications, many of which offered free or 
discounted versions of their service at the beginning of the pandemic.52  
The cognitive bias of framing, however, intensifies in severity during a 
pandemic.  Framing selectively chooses aspects of a given reality and 
amplifies them, typically resulting in different interpretations of the 
item being described.53  It adds different weight to an object and 
influences how a person might perceive it, often to encourage certain 
conclusions over others—for better or worse, depending on how the 
framing is applied.  When it comes to privacy, how an application frames 
a feature will impact whether people consider it to be privacy-protective 
or secure, regardless of how secure a feature truly is.  Framing, then, 
contains the potential to obfuscate problems regardless of intent, 
sometimes in manipulative ways.  In pandemic times, people are 
juggling additional stressors, from health and safety to adjusted living 
situations, and the available mental energy for carefully screening each 
decision for potential manipulation is low in supply.  
The urgency of a global health crisis changes the way people 
perceive lifelines like contact tracing apps or other digital socialization 
software.  When apps offer free services under a banner of altruism or 
helpfulness but fail to inform new, tentative users of the ad or third-
party tracking software already built into their service, they exploit 
individuals’ limited mental resources during an already difficult time.  
Compounded with dark patterns, like requiring account creation or 
providing credit card information for free trials, these ‘altruistic’ offers 
only add to a person’s burdens.54  Some communication and remote 
socialization apps exploded in popularity during the early months of the 
pandemic, when people sought ways to interact under social distancing 
guidelines.  But one such app, HouseParty, was rife with dark patterns 
that prodded users into providing the app with their contact lists, 
 
 51 PROJECT BASELINE, GOOGLE PLAY, https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=
com.google.android.apps.baselinestudy&hl=en_US. 
 52 Chance Miller, These Apps and Services are Responding to Coronavirus Pandemic 
with Free Information, 9TO5MAC (Apr. 2, 2020), https://9to5mac.com/2020/04/02/
apps-and-services-coronavirus. 
 53 Robert M. Entman, Framing: Toward Clarification of a Fractured Paradigm, 43 J. 
COMMC’N 51, 51–58 (1993). 
 54 Woodrow Hartzog et al., Beware of Apps Bearing Gifts in a Pandemic, BERKMAN 
KLEIN CTR. COLLECTION (Aug. 18, 2020), https://medium.com/berkman-klein-center/
beware-of-apps-bearing-gifts-in-a-pandemic-490fabaade01. 
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Facebook friend lists, and unnecessary smartphone permissions—and 
HouseParty’s privacy policy indicates that individuals’ information may 
be used by third parties, other vendors, and their parent organization.55  
Positive framing manipulates users’ cognitive resources and glosses 
over the negatives or existing problematic data collection policies of 
such services.56  
Governments have attempted to address dark patterns through 
legislation, though such changes have yet to be enacted.  The Deceptive 
Experiences to Online Users Reduction (DETOUR) Act of 2019 aims to 
prohibit deceptive user interfaces.  The Act considers dark patterns as 
interfaces with the effect of “obscuring, subverting, or impairing user 
autonomy, design-making, or choice to obtain consent or user data.”57  
The California Privacy Rights Act of 2020 (CPRA) amended the 
California Consumer Privacy Act (CCPA) and explicitly mentions dark 
patterns specific to consent regimes, stating that “agreement obtained 
through use of dark patterns does not constitute consent.”58  Yet there 
is no federal law that prohibits companies from leveraging peoples’ 
limited resources and abilities against them in an adversarial way that 
benefits the company at the expense of the person. 
Misinformation is also a scourge online.  There is some reason to 
believe that the copious amount of misinformation that social media 
companies amplify is not as consistently effective at duping people as 
some headlines might suggest.59  There is plenty of reason, however, to 
be concerned about the fact that misinformation takes up so much real 
estate in our information diets and headspace, crowding out important 
truths and vital public health messaging.  Giving people the choice to 
pick which information is “true” leads to people choosing false 
information as their guiding light or leads to people disengaging from 
information altogether out of decision fatigue.  In both cases, failing to 
prevent the proliferation of false information amplifies the risk of 
encountering bad outcomes.  Additionally, there is evidence that 
algorithmic filtering might facilitate or strengthen echo chambers 
where people are connected to ideas that they are prone to agree with.60  
 
 55 HOUSEPARTY PRIVACY POLICY, https://houseparty.com/privacy-policy. 
 56 Waldman, supra note 42, at 106. 
 57 Deceptive Experiences to Online Users Reduction Act, S. 1084, 116th Cong. 
(2019), https://www.congress.gov/bill/116th-congress/senate-bill/1084/text. 
 58 CALIFORNIA PRIVACY RIGHTS AND ENFORCEMENT ACT OF 2020 (CCPA), CAL. CIV. CODE 
§ 1798.100-1798.199 (2020). 
 59 See generally Miriam J. Metzger et al., From Dark to Light: The Many Shades of 
Sharing Misinformation Online, 9 MEDIA AND COMMN’C 134, 134–43 (2021). 
 60 Uthsav Chitra & Christopher Musco, Analyzing the Impact of Filter Bubbles on 
Social Network Polarization, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 13TH INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON WEB 
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Misinformation can negatively affect public health, racial justice, 
democracy, and the strength of our commitment to public institutions.  
During the pandemic, misinformation messaging is associated to public 
health concerns like vaccine hesitancy and misperceptions of mask-
wearing efficacy,61 as well as racial rumormongering.62  Even if the 
majority of netizens disbelieves online misinformation, the 
consequences of misinformation accepted as truth by some individuals 
risk lives and safety.  
The interfaces and information passing before netizens’ eyes were 
already untrustworthy before the pandemic.  But the stakes were raised 
when severe illness and risk of death were added to the list of potential 
consequences of manipulative content.  
B.  Applications and Devices 
Both smartphone apps and IoT devices can host security 
vulnerabilities and privacy problems.  Frequent discoveries of data 
leaks and breaches make it difficult to trust the devices we use, and even 
more difficult at a time when this trust is most crucial.63   
While a ‘bulletproof’ app or smart device is a thing of fantasy, the 
constant discovery of leaks and security issues in computer science 
research leads to frayed trust in the promises made by application 
markets or platforms like Android and iOS.  Some apps exfiltrate audio, 
videos, and screenshots from an individual’s device to third parties;64 
some apps’ privacy risk varies from version to version.65  Sometimes the 
 
SEARCH AND DATA MINING 115, 115–23 (2020), https://doi.org/10.1145/3336191.337
1825; John Kelly & Camille Francois, This Is What Filter Bubbles Actually Look Like, MIT 
TECH. REV. (Aug. 22, 2018), https://www.technologyreview.com/2018/08/22/140661/
this-is-what-filter-bubbles-actually-look-like; Zoe Schiffer, ‘Filter Bubble’ Author Eli 
Pariser on why we need Publicly Owned Social Networks, VERGE (Nov. 12, 2019), 
https://www.theverge.com/interface/2019/11/12/20959479/eli-pariser-civic-
signals-filter-bubble-q-a. 
 61 Robert Hornik, Ava Kikut, Emma Jesch, Chioma Woko, Leean Siegel & Kwanho 
Kim, Association of COVID-19 Misinformation with Face Mask Wearing and Social 
Distancing in a Nationally Representative US Sample, HEALTH COMMUN. (Nov. 22, 2020), 
https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/33225745.  
 62 Misinformation on Novel Coronavirus Impacting Asian American Businesses, PBS 
NEWSHOUR (Feb. 18, 2020), https://www.pbs.org/newshour/health/misguided-virus-
fears-hitting-asian-american-businesses. 
 63 See DANIEL J. SOLOVE & WOODROW HARTZOG, BREACHED! WHY DATA SECURITY FAILS AND 
HOW TO IMPROVE IT (forthcoming 2021) (on file with author).  
 64 Elleen Pan et al., Panoptispy: Characterizing Audio and Video Exfiltration from 
Android Applications, 2018 PROC. ON PRIV. ENHANCING TECHS. 33, 33–50 (2018). 
 65 Jingjing Ren et al., Bug Fixes, Improvements,…and Privacy Leaks––A Longitudinal 
Study of PII Leaks Across Android App Versions, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 2018 NETWORK AND 
DISTRIBUTED SYSTEMS SECURITY SYMPOSIUM (2018), https://www.ndss-symposium.org/wp-
content/uploads/2018/02/ndss2018_05B-2_Ren_paper.pdf. 
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same online service leaks different information in app form versus 
desktop browser form.66  
Problems with leaky devices make it difficult to trust IoT solutions 
to the pandemic.  Smart devices encompass a wide range of functionality 
enabled by rich sensors like microphones, cameras, and thermostats, 
and recent work finds that they not only exfiltrate potentially sensitive 
data like private conversations67 but also send data to third parties and 
exhibit behavior that allows eavesdroppers to infer user activity.68  
Encryption, while necessary and useful, in some cases cannot hide the 
types of device interactions that create network traffic, which may allow 
an “eavesdropper to infer [the] devices in [a] consumer’s network and 
how they are used.”69  Leaks aside, IoT data may be used against 
consumers even when they are aware of the data collection; health 
organizations like insurance providers have used smart toothbrushes 
and in-car trackers to adjust customers’ rates.70  This information is not 
comforting in the scope of COVID-19, when surveillance technologies 
have been deployed to inspect individuals’ temperatures, movements, 
and compliance with government orders. 
In the rush to find better treatments and a cure, the medical field 
can turn to technology for solutions.  Some consider IoT a potentially 
helpful tool in the arsenal against the virus,71 but discussions of IoT’s 
 
 66 Christophe Leung et al., Should You Use the App for That? Comparing the Privacy 
Implications of App- and Web-Based Online Services, in IMC ‘16: PROCEEDINGS OF THE 
INTERNET MEASUREMENT CONFERENCE 365, 365–72 (2016), https://doi.org/10.1145/2987
443.2987456. 
 67 Daniel J. Dubois et al., When Speakers Are All Ears: Characterizing Misactivations 
of IoT Smart Speakers, 2020 PROC. ON PRIV. ENHANCING TECHS. 255, 255–76 (2020). 
 68 Jingjing Ren et al, Information Exposure From Consumer IoT Devices: A 
Multidimensional, Network-Informed Measurement Approach, in IMC ‘19: PROCEEDINGS OF 
THE INTERNET MEASUREMENT CONFERENCE 267, 267–79 (2019), https://doi.org/10.1145/
3355369.3355577; Said Jawad Saidi et al., A Haystack Full of Needles: Scalable Detection 
of IoT Devices in the Wild, in IMC ‘20: PROCEEDINGS OF THE INTERNET MEASUREMENT 
CONFERENCE 87 (2020), https://arxiv.org/abs/2009.01880. 
 69 Id. 
 70 Christina Farr, This Start-Up Made Connected Toothbrushes––Now it Aims to 
Overthrow the ‘Primitive’ Dental Insurance Industry, CNBC (May 15, 2018), 
https://www.cnbc.com/2018/05/15/beam-dental-raises-22-million-from-kleiner-to-
change-dental-insurance.html; Lee Rainie & Maeve Duggan, Auto Trackers Not Worth 
Car Insurance Discounts, Most Say, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Jan. 14, 2016), 
https://www.pewresearch.org/internet/2016/01/14/scenario-auto-insurance-
discounts-and-monitoring; Tracy Vence, Why We Don’t Recommend Smart Toothbrushes, 
N.Y. TIMES (2020), https://www.nytimes.com/wirecutter/blog/smart-toothbrushes-
dont-recommend. 
 71 Ravi Pratap Singh et al., Internet of Things (IoT) Applications to Fight Against 
COVID-19 Pandemic, 14 DIABETES & METABOLIC SYNDROME: CLINICAL RSCH. & REVS. 521, 521–
24 (2020). 
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merits in a pandemic response cannot take place without accounting for 
the problems with IoT.  Technologies proposed for battling COVID-19 
include small tokens like TraceTogether’s but can also take more 
alarming forms, like unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs)72 and thermal 
facial recognition devices.73  Additional software has improved facial 
recognition capabilities and accounts for mask-wearing,74 adding to a 
slew of prior concerns over facial recognition.75  IoT’s virus-fighting 
benefits cannot be uncoupled from serious ethical concerns, yet some 
researchers scrambling for a solution have omitted the latter while 
focusing only on the efficiency of such tools.76  While the severity of 
COVID-19 calls for some forms of compromise, the additional risks of 
strategies like using GPS data for exposure tracing or passive 
temperature monitoring are still unknown and require stricter 
scrutiny.77 
Coupled with the unprecedented levels of data collection that IoT 
and smartphone sensors are capable of (especially at a global pandemic 
scale), it is difficult to view the benefits of such tracking technologies as 
outweighing the risks. 
C.  Systems and Intentions 
A third area of distrust is at an organizational, systemic level.  Not 
only is it difficult to trust the algorithms and technical systems 
underlying the tools we use but it is additionally difficult to trust those 
who produce these tools.  A technology cannot be decoupled from the 
organization that builds it when considering trust; a well-meaning 
technology company may have biased algorithms, and even 
hypothetically just, fair, and accountable technology may be deployed 
by a company that means to sell it to information-greedy organizations.  
Both the tool and the organization must be trustworthy for people to 
feel comfortable sharing their data.   
 
 72 See generally V. Chamola et al., A Comprehensive Review of the COVID-19 Pandemic 
and the Role of IoT, Drones, AI, Blockchain, and 5G in Managing its Impact, 8 IEEE ACCESS 
90225 (2020). 
 73 Meredith Van Natta et al., The Rise and Regulation of Thermal Facial Recognition 
Technology During the COVID-19 Pandemic, 7 J.L. BIOSCIENCES (forthcoming 2021), 
https://doi.org/10.1093/jlb/lsaa038. 
 74 Face Recognition Software Shows Improvement in Recognizing Masked Faces, NAT’L 
INST. STANDARDS AND TECH. (Dec. 1, 2020), https://www.nist.gov/news-events/news/
2020/12/face-recognition-software-shows-improvement-recognizing-masked-faces. 
 75 Antoaneta Roussi, Resisting the Rise of Facial Recognition, 587 NATURE 350, 350–
53 (2020). 
 76 Chamola et al., supra note 72. 
 77 Van Natta et al., supra note 73. 
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Misinformation’s filter bubble theory, in which personalization 
algorithms may isolate users into information ‘bubbles’ or echo 
chambers,78 is concerning as-is, especially when considering the 
radicalized that susceptible individuals are exposed to online.  The 
danger of filter bubbles, however, is not only in the content but also in 
the logic that determines how people receive content.  Algorithms 
facilitate at-scale automation and improved efficiency when operating 
with many users’ data, but they are not immune from severe flaws like 
bias and discrimination either from faulty training sets or the algorithm 
design itself.  It is not only content delivery algorithms that are in 
question, but advertising delivery ones as well—studies have found that 
platform advertising algorithms may deliver ads that skew along race 
and gender lines, even when the advertiser did not so intend.79  The 
potential for discrimination through advertising is pervasive, even 
when platforms provision rules and categories intended to protect 
against it.80  Biased outcomes from ad delivery networks can arise 
across both demographic81 and political lines,82 eroding trust in the 
content placed before individuals and the platforms that service them. 
For a pandemic-specific case, Facebook updated their advertising 
policies specifically for COVID-19 in reaction83 to findings that their ad 
delivery system approved and accepted highly dangerous, misinformed 
advertisements, like those citing bleach as a cure for the virus.84  A 
reactionary response is better than no response.  Such advertisements 
could have real damage even within short timeframes for 
 
 78 Eli Parisoer, The Filter Bubble: What the Internet is Hiding From You, Penguin 
(2011). 
 79 Ailsa Chang, How Facebook Wants to Handle Misinformation Around the 
Coronavirus Epidemic, NPR (March 25, 2020), https://www.npr.org/2020/03/25/821
591134/how-facebook-wants-to-handle-misinformation-around-the-coronavirus-
epidemic; Kaveh Waddell, Facebook Approved Ads with Coronavirus Misinformation, 
CONSUMER REPS. (April 27, 2020), https://www.consumerreports.org/social-media/
facebook-approved-ads-with-coronavirus-misinformation. 
 80 Giridhari Venkatadri & Alan Mislove, On the Potential for Discrimination via 
Composition, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 2020 ACM INTERNET MEASUREMENT CONFERENCE 333, 
333–44 (2020), https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/3419394.3423641. 
 81 Muhammad Ali et al., Discrimination Through Optimization: How Facebook’s Ad 
Delivery Can Lead to Biased Outcomes, 3 PROC. ACM HUM.-COMPUT. INTERACTIONS 1–30 
(2019); Venkatadri & Mislove, supra note 80. 
 82 Muhammad Ali et al., Ad Delivery Algorithms: The Hidden Arbiters of Political 
Messaging (Mar. 2021), in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 14TH ACM INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON 
WEB SEARCH AND DATA MINING, https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/3437963.3441801. 
 83 Information on Advertising Policies about COVID-19, FACEBOOK, 
https://www.facebook.com/business/help/1123969894625935, (last visited Feb. 11, 
2021). 
 84 Waddell, supra note 79. 
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exposure—and it is still difficult to be sure that all dangerous 
advertisements are effectively filtered from the platform.  
Trusting or mistrusting an algorithm, however, is different from 
being able to trust the organization handling your data.  Already 
concerned about abuses of their data in technology they use, people are 
especially worried when the incentives of the companies processing 
their data are murky—or outright controversial.  Kashmir Hill’s 
groundbreaking piece on Clearview AI in January 202085 shocked the 
world—how could laypeople have known that a secretive facial 
recognition start-up was scraping the internet for their photographs, let 
alone selling this data to law enforcement?86  The slew of reactions that 
followed included cease-and-desists from the companies from whom 
Clearview scraped public data,87 several class action lawsuits over 
Clearview’s data collection,88 and considerable discourse over the 
statutory immunity given to Internet service providers regarding 
liability for hosting the content of third parties.89  Companies using 
Clearview’s dataset were under fire as well, with class action lawsuits 
filed against them for their patronage.90   
 
 85 Kashmir Hill, The Secretive Company That Might End Privacy as We Know It, N.Y. 
TIMES (Jan. 18, 2020) https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/18/technology/clearview-
privacy-facial-recognition.html. 
 86 Elizabeth Lopatto, Clearview AI CEO Says ‘Over 2,400 Police Agencies’ are Using its 
Facial Recognition Software, VERGE (Aug. 26, 2020), https://www.theverge.com/2020/
8/26/21402978/clearview-ai-ceo-interview-2400-police-agencies-facial-recognition. 
 87 Clearview AI Responds to Cease-and-Desist Letters by Claiming First Amendment 
Right to Publicly Available Data, HARV. J.L. & TECH., https://jolt.law.harvard.edu/digest/
clearview-ai-responds-to-cease-and-desist-letters-by-claiming-first-amendment-right-
to-publicly-available-data; Google, Youtube, Venmo and LinkedIn Send Cease-and-Desist 
Letters to Facial Recognition App That Helps Law Enforcement, CBS NEWS (Feb. 5, 2020, 
6:25 AM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/clearview-ai-google-youtube-send-cease-
and-desist-letter-to-facial-recognition-app. 
 88 Amanda Bronstad, NY-Based Facial Recognition Tech Company Wrangles With 
Judges in Two States Over Privacy Class Actions, N.Y.L.J. (Sept. 10, 2020), 
https://www.law.com/newyorklawjournal/2020/09/10/ny-based-facial-recognition-
tech-company-wrangles-with-judges-in-two-states-over-privacy-class-actions; Erin 
Shaak, Clearview AI Hit with Class Action Lawsuit Over Controversial Data Collection 
Practices, CLASS ACTION BLOG, https://www.classaction.org/blog/clearview-ai-hit-with-
class-action-lawsuit-over-controversial-data-collection-practices. 
 89 Eric Goldman, Facial Recognition Database Vendor May Not Qualify for Section 
230-Vermont v. Clearview, TECH. & MARKETING L. BLOG (Sept. 18, 2020), https://blog.eric
goldman.org/archives/2020/09/facial-recognition-database-vendor-may-not-qualify-
for-section-230-vermont-v-clearview.htm; Naomi Owen, #Privacy: Clearview Refers to 
Section 230 in Vermont Lawsuit to Avoid Alleged Privacy Violations, PRIVSEC REPORT (June 
4, 2020). 
 90 Sara Morrison, The World’s Scariest Facial Recognition Company is now Linked to 
Everybody from ICE to Macy’s, VOX (Feb. 26, 2020), https://www.vox.com/recode/2020/
2/26/21154606/clearview-ai-data-breach; Macy’s Hit with BIPA Lawsuit for Using 
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The scale of Clearview’s collection coupled with its law 
enforcement partnerships and undetected operation serves as an 
example of why we cannot easily trust industry actors and governments 
with our sensitive data.  In pandemic times, heightened intensity in the 
types of data collected, where from, how much, and who uses this data 
exacerbates these fears.  In countries like China and Israel, pandemic 
technologies were married to the government from the outset and 
directly linked to existing surveillance technologies.91  In the previously 
discussed Singapore example, the government stated that the dataset 
was for COVID-19 purposes only, but revealed law enforcement uses 
that reneged on original promises.92  Some increased monitoring is 
necessary to track the spread of the coronavirus, but not all such 
monitoring.  Added surveillance measures like facial recognition with 
thermal scans, telecom and cellular data used for location tracking, and 
QR code check-in apps tied to real identification are dangerous pretexts 
for “accelerating the mass collection of personal data to track citizens,” 
and this mission creep93 makes us wary.94  
The task of determining what level of data collection is appropriate 
for such extraordinary times is extremely difficult.  For a solution to 
work, it must be widely adopted and provide governments with enough 
information to stay ahead of the virus’ spread.  If people cannot trust 
that this information will not be over-collected or later abused, 
necessary levels of adoption will be difficult to reach.  
  
 
Clearview Biometric Surveillance, FINDBIOMETRICS, https://findbiometrics.com/macys-
hit-bipa-lawsuit-using-clearview-biometric-surveillance-080701. 
 91 Anat Ben-David, Israel is Following China on Surveillance. Here’s Why that Should 
Worry You, HAARETZ (Dec. 2, 2020), https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/tech-
news/.premium-israel-is-following-china-on-surveillance-that-should-worry-you-
1.9343225; Tehilla Shwartz Altshuler & Rachel Aridor Hershkowitz, How Israel’s COVID-
19 Mass Surveillance Operation Works, BROOKINGS INST. (July 6, 2020), 
https://www.brookings.edu/techstream/how-israels-covid-19-mass-surveillance-
operation-works; Lily Kuo, “The New Normal”: China’s Excessive Coronavirus Public 
Monitoring Could be Here to Stay, GUARDIAN (Mar. 9, 2020), http://www.the
guardian.com/world/2020/mar/09/the-new-normal-chinas-excessive-coronavirus-
public-monitoring-could-be-here-to-stay. 
 92 Sato, supra note 24. 
 93 Daniel Ryan Koslosky & Fletcher N. Baldwin, Mission Creep in National Security 
Law, 114 W. VA. L. REV. (2011); Wendy K. Mariner, Mission Creep: Public Health 
Surveillance and Medical Privacy, 87 B.U. L. REV. 347 (2007). 
 94 Kuo, supra note 91. 
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IV.  CLOSING THE TRUST GAP  
Even though information technologies are not worthy of our trust 
now, lawmakers could change that fact before the next public health 
emergency.  To close the trust gap between the organizations that build 
or leverage data-intensive technologies and the people that use them, 
especially in global health emergencies, lawmakers and organizations 
should move beyond individualistic “consent and control over” 
approaches to privacy to include relationships of trust, radically 
overhaul design frameworks for information technologies, and embrace 
substantive rules instead of procedures that ignore power dynamics and 
justify practices that might be fair to the individual, but result in net 
harm to society.  Relational models of privacy are more sensitive to the 
power disparities between people and tech companies.  Strengthened 
design frameworks help provide structure to relational norms of loyalty 
and care, and they give people evidence that a system or company is 
worth trusting.  Substantive rules draw hard lines in the sand to keep 
people protected whenever improved norms or frameworks are still not 
enough. 
A.  Relational Duties of Trust 
The trust gap exists in part due to the breakneck speed of 
development for privacy-violating technologies.  Pandemic response 
requires thorough and deep collaboration between the public and 
private sectors, but when people cannot comfortably put aside their 
worries regarding the technologies intended to help them, trust in 
government and well-meaning private organizations wanes.  
When adoption at-scale is not only desired but a matter of life and 
death for many, all actors implementing technological solutions or 
strategies should operate from a place of duty.  A few options have been 
proposed, from building off relational obligations of trust, with specific 
obligations of loyalty, care, forthrightness, confidentiality, and more.95  
 
 95 See SOLOVE, supra note 39; WALDMAN, PRIVACY AS TRUST, supra note 39; Balkin, 
Information Fiduciaries, supra note 39, at 186; https://www.theatlantic.com/
technology/archive/2016/10/information-fiduciary/502346; Lindsey Barrett, 
Confiding in Con Men: U.S. Privacy Law, the GDPR, and Information Fiduciaries, 42 SEATTLE 
U. L. REV. 1057 (2019); Brennan-Marquez, supra note 39; Ariel Dobkin, Information 
Fiduciaries in Practice: Data Privacy and User Expectations, 33 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1, 1 
(2018); Kerr, supra note 39; Paul Ohm, Forthright Code, 56 HOUS. L. REV. 471 (2018); 
Richards & Hartzog, Taking Trust Seriously, supra note 39; Richards & Hartzog, Privacy’s 
Trust Gap, supra note 39, at 1188; Richards & Hartzog, Trusting Big Data Research, supra 
note 39; Christopher W. Savage, Managing the Ambient Trust Commons: The Economics 
of Online Consumer Information Privacy, 22 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 95 (2019); Scholz, supra 
note 39; Waldman, Privacy As Trust, supra note 39; Waldman, Privacy, Sharing, and Trust, 
supra note 39; Richard S. Whitt, Old School Goes Online: Exploring Fiduciary Obligations 
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The ideas outlined in these proposals argue that technology 
organizations should be seen as agents or stewards to those who trust 
them: their users.  People are inherently vulnerable both to poor 
outcomes from decisions tech companies intentionally make, and to 
attacks on these companies’ security by external threats.  This leaves 
people vulnerable in their information relationships, and mandated 
trust keeps these relationships afloat.96  For example, a properly 
implemented duty of loyalty would prohibit companies from taking any 
actions regarding their technologies’ design or from processing of users’ 
personal information that conflicted with their best interests, to the 
extent of their exposure.97  This would prohibit dark patterns that 
turned people’s limitations against themselves and algorithmic 
decision-making that was opaque, wrongfully biased, and harmful, or 
which deprived people of significant opportunities.  Alleviating the 
burden of this vulnerability from the end-user requires considerable 
faith in the controlling organization—namely, that technology 
companies and government organizations responsibly handle and 
communicate the risks of data disclosure to people.  Improving trust 
improves the technologically-mediated relationship between people 
and companies.  During a pandemic, improving this relationship might 
additionally improve the adoption of tools used to control the 
coronavirus. 
B.  Consent, Liability, and Design Frameworks 
When understandings of trust and loyalty mend information 
relationships, new standards in design and consent regimes that reflect 
changing norms should follow.  Frameworks facilitate these 
relationships and help people feel safe with technologies that hold 
themselves to these structures.  Even when an individual information 
relationship fails, industry standards can help keep people protected at 
a systemic level and let the consumer control what information 
relationships to cultivate.  
  
 
of Loyalty and Care in the Digital Platforms Era, 36 SANTA CLARA COMP. & HIGH TECH L.J. 75 
(2019); Jonathan Zittrain, Engineering an Election, 127 HARV. L. REV. F. 335, 340 (2014); 
Jack Balkin & Jonathan Zittrain, A Grand Bargain to Make Tech Companies Trustworthy, 
ATLANTIC (Oct. 3, 2016), Cameron F. Kerry, Why Protecting Privacy Is a Losing Game 
Today—and How to Change the Game, BROOKINGS INST. (July 12, 2018), 
https://www.brookings.edu/research/why-protecting-privacy-is-a-losing-game-
today-and-how-to-change-the-game.  But see Khan & Pozen, supra note 39. 
 96 Richards & Hartzog, supra note 39. 
 97 See, e.g., Richards & Hartzog, A Duty of Loyalty, supra note 39.   
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Digital consent regimes are ultimately broken and insufficient to 
address the ways individuals interact with online technologies.  When 
people use a device or application, they subject themselves to the 
provisions outlined in the technology’s Terms of Use, Terms and 
Conditions, and privacy policies.  These technologies enjoy carte 
blanche when they shift the burden of liability onto the user, while 
individuals are left to deal with the fallout of privacy violations and 
other misuses of their data.  Users need not read these terms to be 
bound by them,98 as with the shrink-wrap licenses99 in the late 1900s.  
Individuals should not, however, be expected to read these terms and 
policies—not when the burden and cost of doing so are incredibly 
high.100  When consent is provided in this fashion, people are 
unwittingly trapped into contracts they do not truly understand.  In 
pandemic times, consent can feel more coercive,101 as with Project 
Baseline’s Google Account requirement102—it can feel like the choices 
are between making an account and getting a test, on which one’s life 
may depend.  This can hardly be called an “agreement,” nor can it stand 
up to new standards of consent, like those desired by regulations like 
the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR).103 
To fix broken consent regimes, we can consider ideal 
circumstances for providing consent and create frameworks that guide 
organizations as they handle consent statements and registration flows.  
Beyond the requirements outlined in privacy laws like the GDPR,104 
meaningful consent requests should be infrequent, with easily 
envisioned risks, and the reasons for consenting should be accompanied 
by incentives for data subjects to seriously examine the request.105  
Consider the trust relationship in vaccinations, which provides an 
example of what an ideal consent regime might include.  People do not 
frequently receive vaccines: this satisfies the first precondition.  The 
next two preconditions allow people to conduct an effective risk-benefit 
analysis.  Before vaccination, people are provided with relevant 
 
 98 Mark A. Lemley & Eugene Volokh, Law, Virtual Reality, and Augmented Reality, 166 
U. PA. L. REV. 1051, 1116 (2017). 
 99 NANCY S. KIM, WRAP CONTRACTS: FOUNDATIONS AND RAMIFICATIONS 36 (2013); Mark A. 
Lemley, Terms of Use, 91 MINN. L. REV. 459, 467 (2006);. 
 100 See generally Aleecia M. McDonald & Lorrie Faith Cranor, The Cost of Reading 
Privacy Policies, 4 I/S: J.L. POL. INFO. SOC. 543 (2019).  
 101 Neil Richards & Woodrow Hartzog, The Pathologies of Digital Consent, 96 WASH. U. 
L. REV. 1461, 1461–1503. 
 102 COVID-19 Testing Program, supra note 7. 
 103 Council Regulation 2016/679, 2016 O.J. (L 119) 1, 6. 
 104 See generally Council Regulation 2016/679, 2016 O.J. (L 119). 
 105 Richards & Hartzog, supra note 101. 
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information as to potential side effects and the risks of forgoing 
vaccination.  For COVID-19, the risk of going unvaccinated may include 
severe and life-threatening complications, while the benefits include 
virus prevention and improved safety for people in contact with a 
vaccinated person.106  The risk is vivid and easily imagined; the benefits 
provide a real incentive for a person consenting to vaccination.  
This framework for understanding consent is applicable to data 
collection.  People are inundated with fallible consent requests 
everywhere, in pop-ups,107 app permission requests, websites’ cookie 
banners,108 account registration, and myriad other ‘agreements’ that 
may not provide people with real avenues for providing consent.  These 
requests are not infrequent—too many consent requests will begin to 
lose meaning and can be annoying and deceptive.109  The risk of 
consenting to these notices is not vivid or clear—the risks are hidden in 
time-consuming legal documents.  Fixing these consent regimes to be 
more empowering, meaningful, and transparent for users is necessary 
for restoring trust and for giving control over data back to the people 
who provide it.  How this would occur is beyond the scope of this Essay, 
but we imagine stronger guidance around when to provide notice and 
how as well as formal design structures that delegate more control to 
the end-user.  
Privacy-forward design frameworks must accompany improved 
consent solutions.  Problems with consent are exacerbated when 
interface tricks are employed to obfuscate the contents of a technology’s 
terms.  Research into why designs like dark patterns are so 
problematic110 and suggestions for improved privacy interfaces111 help 
 
 106 CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, COVID-19 AND YOUR HEALTH, 
https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/vaccines/vaccine-benefits.html (last 
updated Jan. 5, 2021, last visited Feb. 14, 2021) 
 107 Midas Nouwens et al., Dark Patterns After the GDPR: Scraping Consent Pop-ups and 
Demonstrating Their Influence, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 2020 CHI CONFERENCE HUMAN FACTORS 
COMPUTING SYSTEMS 1, 1–13 (2020), http://doi.org/10.1145/3313831.3376321. 
 108 Célestin Matte et al., Do Cookie Banners Respect my Choice?: Measuring Legal 
Compliance of Banners from IAB Europe’s Transparency and Consent Framework, in 2020 
IEEE SYMPOSIUM ON SECURITY AND PRIVACY (SP) 791, 791–809 (2020). 
 109 Most Cookie Banners are Annoying and Deceptive. This is not Consent., PRIVACY INT’L 
(2019), http://privacyinternational.org/explainer/2975/most-cookie-banners-are-
annoying-and-deceptive-not-consent. 
 110 See generally Dark Patterns at a Scale, supra note 41; What Makes a Dark 
Pattern…Dark?, supra note 41. 
 111 See generally LORRIE FAITH CRANOR ET AL., CYLAB SEC. AND PRIV. INST., DESIGN AND 
EVALUATION OF A USABLE ICON AND TAGLINE TO SIGNAL AN OPT-OUT OF THE SALE OF PERSONAL 
INFORMATION AS REQUIRED BY CCPA,  (2020); Patrick Gage Kelley et al., A “Nutrition Label” 
for Privacy, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 5TH SYMPOSIUM ON USABLE PRIVACY AND SECURITY 1, 1–12 
(2009), http://doi.org/10.1145/1572532.1572538. 
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articulate why design-level regulation is so imperative.  While the 
DETOUR Act would require that online operators frequently present 
disclosures on data use and that these disclosures not be “deceptively 
obscured,”112 robust design standards that clarify when an interface 
element becomes “dark” could provide better guidance for user 
experience designers.  While there are various aspects of the DETOUR 
Act that might create implementation problems, the bill outlines the 
need for a professional standards body that would help define 
acceptable conduct and build design frameworks driven by ethics and 
value sensitivity.113  
In addition to bolstering privacy design frameworks, we should 
work to improve Fair Information Practice Principles (FIPPs)-based 
protections (normative guidance for information practices),114 which 
often fail in practice.115  Efforts to improve privacy by design that rely 
on expounding the importance of FIPPs should also seek to amend the 
FIPPs themselves, expanding them from vague principles to actionable 
guidance for practitioners.  GDPR’s guidance on “data protection by 
design and default”116 is an excellent start, but effective approaches like 
the GDPR’s should strive to provide stricter, more specific parameters 
regarding what design choices to make.  
C.  Substantive Rules Limiting Data Collection and Use 
Changes in information relationship norms and interface design 
can be incredibly powerful for protecting a user’s individual welfare, but 
substantive legal rules can help prevent privacy problems when the 
previous two recommendations fail to be enough.  Consent regimes are 
practically unscalable, overly individualistic, and function to justify all 
manner of harmful actions so long as companies that control people’s 
medium of expression can extract a perfunctory acquiescence.117  What 
is needed are un-waivable rules, beyond flexible purposes stated by 
companies and governments themselves, that limit when companies 
 
 112 Deceptive Experiences to Online Users Reduction Act, S. 1084, 116th Cong. 
(2019), https://www.congress.gov/bill/116th-congress/senate-bill/1084/text. 
 113 Id. 
 114 MARTHA K. LANDESBERG ET AL., U.S. FED. TRADE COMM’N, PRIVACY ONLINE: A REPORT TO 
CONGRESS, at 71 (2009), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/
privacy-online-report-congress/priv-23a.pdf. 
 115 Fred H. Cate, The Failure of Fair Information Practice Principles, in CONSUMER 
PROTECTION IN THE AGE OF THE INFORMATION ECONOMY 343, 343 (Jane K. Winn ed., 2006), 
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_comments/2018/12/ftc-2018-
0098-d-0036-163372.pdf. 
 116 Council Regulation 2016/679, 2016 O.J. (L 119) 1, 45. 
 117 Richards & Hartzog, supra note 101; Evan Selinger & Woodrow Hartzog, The 
Inconsentability of Facial Surveillance, 66 LOY. L. REV. 33 (2020);. 
GUNAWAN (DO NOT DELETE) 5/14/2021  12:29 PM 
2021] THE TECHNOLOGY TRUST GAP 1531 
and governments can collect information, what kinds of information 
they can collect, how they can use it, and with whom they can share it.  
Concerns over law enforcement’s use of COVID-19 tracing data are 
well-founded, as indicated by Singapore’s case.  One way to prevent 
further violations of privacy at the hands of the government is to 
disallow law enforcement use of tracking data from the outset, whether 
that be pandemic-specific datasets or privately collected datasets like 
Clearview’s facial database.  Australia’s pandemic response provides an 
example of trust-building through substantive rules, particularly 
regarding their COVIDSafe contact tracing app,118 released in April 2020.  
At launch, the app was accompanied by an emergency Determination 
under Australia’s Biosecurity Act of 2015 that would allow the 
collection, use, and disclosure of COVIDSafe data for prosecuting 
citizens for offenses under the Act.119  Researchers quickly responded 
with concerns over potential law enforcement use of the COVIDSafe 
data, describing the COVIDSafe provisions as “an experiment in 
surveillance and trust,” and pointed out flaws in the Determination as 
well as other issues with data use and minimization.120  This 
Determination was quickly repealed on May 15, 2020, with the Privacy 
Amendment (Public Health Contact Information) Act 2020.121  The 
Privacy Amendment Act not only disallowed law enforcement use of 
COVIDSafe data but also created new offenses for using this dataset for 
purposes other than contact tracing.  The government addressed other 
concerns regarding the technical security of the application or in-the-
background data collection by making the source code for both Android 
and iOS versions of COVIDSafe publicly available on Github.122  Updates 
to the source code are pushed to Github and are available for review by 
the technical community.   
Australia’s rapid and preemptive measures to alleviate fears of 
data abuse reflect desired traits for a pandemic response: as transparent 
as possible, swiftly deployed, and carefully articulated.  These traits are 
also necessary for any technical solutions for the pandemic, especially 
 
 118 COVIDSafe App, AUSTRALIAN GOV. DEP’T OF HEALTH (2020), https://www.health.gov.
au/resources/apps-and-tools/covidsafe-app. 
 119 Biosecurity (Human Biosecurity Emergency) (Human Coronavirus with 
Pandemic Potential) (Emergency Requirements—Public Health Contact Information) 
Determination 2020, pt. 2 paras 6–9 (Austl.) (no longer in force). 
 120 Graham Greenleaf & Katharine Kemp, Australia’s ‘COVIDSafe App’: An Experiment 
in Surveillance, Trust and Law 2 (April 30, 2020) (unpublished manuscript) (available 
as part of the University of New South Wales Law Research Series, 2021), 
http://classic.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/UNSWLRS/2021/7.html. 
 121 Privacy Amendment (Public Health Contact Information) Act, sch. 1 div. 2 s 94D 
(Austl.). 
 122 COVIDSafe, GITHUB, https://github.com/AU-COVIDSafe. 
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where risk of surveillance is high.  Conversely, Singapore’s delayed 
responses to privacy concerns and later exposure of law enforcement 
uses of TraceTogether data provide an example of retroactive measures.  
To keep citizens’ data protected and retain their trust, substantive rules 
and prohibitions must be outlined well in advance.  To maintain trust 
and inspire it, these substantive rules should be accompanied by 
auditing and enforcement; such rules will only be useful if they are 
followed.  
Beyond the pandemic, industry and governments will continue to 
find future uses for large-scale data collection and analysis.  To prepare 
for these developments, governments should preemptively outline 
explicit limits for the protection of individuals’ data.  One path forward 
that may help build substantive lines in the sand for data collection is to 
use frameworks for understanding data disclosure by weighing the 
data’s utility against an individual’s disclosure risk.123  
V.  CONCLUSION 
Before the pandemic, we were living with technologies that 
disrespected or mishandled our privacy, our choices, and our online 
safety.  These problems led to a trust gap between individuals, 
technology companies, and governments—a trust gap that has only 
widened as a reaction to concerning COVID-19 practices like contact 
tracing and mission creep.  
While the world races toward a solution to the pandemic, privacy 
and digital health must not become afterthoughts or sacrificial lambs.  
The trust gap must be closed, not only to improve adoption of pandemic-
response technologies but also to protect people well after the threat of 
the virus subsides.  Adopting relational duties of loyalty and care can 
help allay some of these concerns, especially when combined with 
structured design frameworks that improve or outright eliminate 
consent regimes and reduce interface trickery.  These adjustments are 
potential starts toward mending the broken trust between people and 
data organizations—but they are not enough.  Substantive rules 
prohibiting misuse of data, particularly COVID-19 data, are necessary to 
protect individuals’ privacy rights and prevent future invasions of 
privacy from occurring.  
  
 
 123 GEORGE T. DUNCAN ET AL.,  Disclosure Risk vs. Data Utility: The R-U Confidentiality 
Map, NAT’L INST. STAT. SCIS., at 31 (2001). 
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The urgency of the pandemic must not be used as an excuse to 
deprioritize user privacy or undermine trust—it must be seen as an 
opportunity to rebuild confidence and create better digital experiences 
that outlast the global health crisis.   
 
